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Abstract
This experiment study used a 2 × 3 between-subjects design to assess two factors in
crisis communication and reputation management—prior corporate reputation (good
and bad) and crisis response strategies (apology, sympathy, and compensation)—
on an organization facing high crisis responsibility. Results indicate that stakeholders prefer apology to compensation response strategies. Organizations with a prior
good reputation have better postcrisis reviews that those with a prior bad reputation. Crisis managers facing crises that generate high attribution of crisis responsibility and anger are advised to rely on apology rather than compensation strategy. It would also be advantageous for an organization with prior good reputation
to highlight its past achievements when responding to a crisis.

Corporations, just like politicians and celebrities, are constantly in
the public eye and often find themselves in crisis situations. At stake
when a corporation is faced with a crisis is its reputation. Corporate
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reputation can affect a wide range of issues from stock values to employee morale (Hearit, 2001; Lyon & Cameron, 2004). It is thus important that when a crisis strikes, the organization employs appropriate crisis response strategies with a view to minimizing the impact of
the crisis and protecting organizational reputation.
Research has shown that what an organization says and does after a crisis—crisis response strategies—goes a long way toward protecting organizational reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 2008).
Most postcrisis communication research, however, has relied on case
study methods, and although case studies offer valuable descriptive
data, they ‘‘offer little insight into how stakeholders actually respond
to crisis response strategies’’ (Coombs & Holladay, 2008, p. 252). Case
studies also offer minimal theoretical understanding of crisis communication (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Dean, 2004).
Over the last decade, crisis communication research has begun to
use experimental design methods geared toward assessing the public’s perception of crisis response strategies (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Dean, 2004). Coombs (2007) urged communication researchers to go beyond the speculation of case studies based on media
reports to create evidence-based crisis communication. The current
study used an experimental design to investigate the effects of three
crisis response strategies (apology, compensation, and sympathy) and
precrisis reputation on the organization’s postcrisis reputation, anger toward the organization, and negative word-of-mouth intention
about the organization.
In a related experimental study involving the manipulation of four
response strategies (apology, compensation, sympathy, and information) for an actual chemical explosion at Marcus Oil, Coombs and
Holladay (2008) found that there were no significant differences between sympathy, compensation, and apology conditions on company
reputation. The lack of significance between the three crisis response
strategies could be traced to the nature of the study—an industrial accident where no cause had been determined and the public was less
angry about the accident (Coombs & Holladay, 2008). Consequently,
Coombs and Holladay (2008) suggested that ‘‘it is possible that different results could be found if the attributions of crisis responsibility and anger are high’’ (p. 255).
The current study sought to extend crisis communication research
by manipulating sympathy, compensation, and apology response
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strategies for a fictitious organization facing high attributions of crisis responsibility and high public anger as recommended by Coombs
and Holladay (2008). This study sheds light on how various crisis response strategies for an organization facing high attributions of crisis responsibility and high public anger interact with organizational
prior reputation. Results from this study will help organizations facing high attributions of crisis responsibility and public anger understand the type of crisis response strategies to use. The use of experimental method to test the applicability of crisis response strategies
provides empirical evidence that aids in the building of crisis communication theory.
The potential impact that each of the three crisis response strategies (apology, compensation, and sympathy) would have on various
publics such as victims of the crisis, negotiators for victims, lawyers,
lobby groups, and the society at large is worth noting. It would be
valuable for the relevant publics and the society in general to understand the nature of each crisis response strategy, the context under
which each is conveyed, and the extent to which the strategy is capable of minimizing the impact of the crisis in their lives.
Because apology is one of the most used, demanded, complex, and
controversial strategies, it would be necessary for the relevant publics and the society to understand the differences between a partial
and full apology. A partial apology is usually ‘‘an expression of concern and regret,’’ whereas a full apology acknowledges the crisis, accepts responsibility, and provides an explanation of what the organization will do to make sure the crisis does not happen again (Coombs,
2015, p. 148).
A partial apology is often used to protect the organization from
legal liability, whereas a full apology is and should be used on crises
that are preventable in nature, such as human-error accidents and
organizational faults (Coombs, 2015). The organizational publics and
other members of the society value apology because it acknowledges
that social norms were disrupted, shows respect to the victims, and is
the first step toward the rebuilding of relationships between the organization and the victims of the crisis (Coombs, 2015; De Cremer, Pillutla, & Folmer, 2011).
Like apology, compensation is a rebuilding or accommodative response strategy that should also be used on crises that are preventable in nature. Members of the society who happen to be victims of
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a preventable crisis are likely to have a strong case for compensation
from the organization involved. According to Coombs (2015), the use
of compensation response strategy is a sign that the organization is
taking responsibility for the crisis. In most cases, compensation involves the organization providing money or other gifts to the victims.
The sympathy response strategy is used when the organization wants
to express concern to the victims of a crisis. Like compensation, the
sympathy strategy is regarded as honorable and effective in restoring positive perceptions toward the organization because it portrays
the organization as sympathetic and taking responsibility for the crisis (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000).
With a better understanding of the nature of each of the three
crisis response strategies and the situation in which each of them is
used, organizational publics, victims, and society in general would be
in a better position to hold the responsible organization=individual
accountable, and as a result demand a fitting apology or negotiate for
compensation to minimize the impact of the crisis on the victims and
other affected members of the society.
Using the theoretical frameworks of reputation management and
situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), the next section of
this article reviews some existing literature on organizational reputation and crisis response strategies.

Literature Review
Corporate Reputation
Because of their ability to communicate to various publics about the
nature of an organization, public relations practitioners are responsible for the building and maintenance of a company’s reputation (Wilcox, Ault, Agee, & Cameron, 2000). Coombs (2000) defined the reputation of an organization in terms of relational history, which is
related to the expectation of stakeholders. Delivering on stakeholders’ expectations can include customer service, media transparency,
and community involvement.
Frombrun and Van Riel (1997) defined corporate reputation as a
collective representation of a company’s past actions to deliver valuable outcomes to stakeholders. Sims (2009) noted that reputation is
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formed by the perceptions that people have about an organization
based upon their prior experiences. Weigelt and Camerer (1988) conceptualized corporate reputation in terms of actions that can be attributed to an organization’s past actions. According to these conceptualizations, corporate reputation is to some extent based on the past
actions of an organization.
Some studies on corporate reputation have also raised the question
of the time it takes for reputation to build and how it should be measured. Caruana (1997) argued that to assess the ‘‘effectiveness of activities undertaken’’ by a corporation, there is a need for an instrument
that ‘‘enables the measurement of corporate reputation over time’’ (p.
114). Nguyen and Leblanc (2001) agreed that reputation ‘‘needs many
good transactions over time’’ (p. 229).
Doorley and Garcia (2011) argued that a good reputation has both
intangible and tangible benefits. Intangible benefits—a good feeling
about the organization by its customers, employees, and consumer advocates—have the potential of translating into tangible benefits such
as an organization attracting better candidates, paying less for supplies, increased profitability, and gaining free press (Doorley & Garcia, 2011). Although a good reputation enhances the perception of an
organization as a stable and reliable entity to invest in among potential shareholders, a bad reputation makes it harder for an organization to attract investors and to get financing (Aula & Mantere, 2008).
Although crisis managers believe that prior good corporate reputation can benefit an organization during a crisis, there is a dearth of
empirical evidence that can support this proposition (Coombs & Holladay, 2006). Dowling (2002) noted,
To date there are few published scientific studies of how a crisis
(adversely) affects a company’s images and reputations. Much
of what (we think) we know is opinion based rather than well
researched. For example, many managers believe that a good
corporate reputation acts as a type of insurance policy the first
time the company faces a serious crisis. (p. 252)

Using crisis scenarios of organizations facing negative publicity
stemming from claims of sexual harassment and a potentially lethal
toxic spill into a river, Lyon and Cameron (2004) found that there
were better attitudes toward companies with prior good reputation
than companies with prior bad reputation. More empirical evidence
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is, however, required to offer guidance to crisis managers on how to
protect a reputation from the ravages of a crisis (Coombs, 2007; Rousseau, 2006). The following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: An organization with a prior good reputation will have a better post-crisis reputation evaluation than when that organization has a prior bad reputation.
Because crises are unpredictable and negative, they tend to provoke attributions of responsibility, and attribution theory, a socialpsychological theory, has sought to explain how human beings make
sense of events (Coombs, 2015; Weiner, 1986, 2006). Attribution theory posits that when an event occurs, particularly a negative one, people will try to establish why the event happened. The attributions of
responsibility determine how a member of the public feels and behaves toward the organization (Coombs, 2015).
Society attributes responsibility for events based on limited evidence with the blame being directed at the person or organization involved in the incident (internal) or environmental (external) factors
(Coombs, 2010). Weiner (1986) argued that the attributions of internal or external responsibility play a key role in determining emotional
and behavioral reactions to the organization or individual involved in
a crisis. Behavioral actions are negative when a person or organization is judged responsible for the event, whereas behavioral actions
are positive when a person or organization is judged not responsible
for the event (Weiner, 2006).
Core emotional responses emerging from a crisis include anger
and negative word of mouth among affective reactions (Coombs &
Holladay, 2008). Anger from stakeholders can ruin the organization–
stakeholder relationships, and it can also lead stakeholders to say bad
things about the organization to people they know (Coombs & Holladay, 2007; Jorgensen, 1996; Stockmyer, 1996). Word of mouth is valued by organizations because, although positive word of mouth is a
powerful persuasion, negative word of mouth has been shown to have
stronger consequences on consumer evaluations of organizations (Laczniak, DeCarlo, & Ramaswami, 2001).
Because anger and word of mouth are important emotional responses that could emerge from a crisis event, more empirical evidence is required to establish whether prior reputation has an impact
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on crisis emotional reaction outcomes such as anger and word of
mouth. The following hypotheses are proposed:
H2: An organization with a prior good reputation will experience less public anger than an organization with prior bad
reputation.
H3: An organization with a prior good reputation will experience
lower intentions of negative word-of-mouth than an organization with prior bad reputation.

Crisis Response Strategies
SCCT builds upon attribution theory to predict the reputational threat
posed by a crisis and to recommend the crisis response strategies that
would most appropriately protect the reputation of an organization
(Coombs, 2007). By understanding the crisis situation, a crisis manager can determine the crisis response strategies that will protect the
reputation of the organization. SCCT posits that the potential reputational damage emerging from a crisis is a function of crisis responsibility. Crisis responsibility, the extent to which the public attributes
the cause of the crisis, is in turn a function of the crisis type and severity of the damage (Coombs, 2006).
SCCT further posits that the choice of crisis response strategies
should be influenced by crisis type. The choice of crisis response strategies can be achieved by matching crisis clusters—victim, accidental,
and preventable— to the appropriate response options—denial, diminish (e.g., excuse and justification), and deal option (e.g., concern,
compensation, sympathy, and apology; Coombs, 1995). Crisis responsibility in the victim cluster is ‘‘very low and there is little violation of
societal norms’’ to use denial (Coombs, 2006, p. 249).
There is, however, high crisis responsibility for crises falling under the accidental cluster, and therefore the diminish response option
should be used. Coombs (2006) noted that within the accidental cluster ‘‘stakeholders are open to influence on attributions of the crisis because the threat is minimal’’ (p. 249). In the preventable cluster, crises produce ‘‘very strong’’ attributions of crisis responsibility and the
deal response options should be used. Strong attributions of crisis responsibility represent serious violation of societal norms, thus placing
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organizational reputation on the line. The crisis in the current study
falls within the preventable cluster as the stimuli purposely draw attention to the high organizational responsibility and preventable nature of the crisis.
Benoit (1995), Benoit and Drew (1997), and Coombs and Holladay (2008) noted that researchers have overemphasized the use of
apology= mortification as the best crisis response for any type of crisis. The use of an apology involves the organization accepting full responsibility for the crisis and asking for forgiveness (Benoit & Drew,
1997). Fuchs-Bernett (2002), Patel and Reinsch (2003), and Tyler
(1997) noted that accepting responsibility is the highlight of an apology and makes it the most expensive apologetic device financially for
a corporation.
When an organization issues an apology, it opens itself to lawsuits
and economic consequences because the apology is used in court as
evidence to win lawsuits against the corporation (Coombs & Holladay, 2008). Rather than use apology, which might be costly for the organization, Coombs and Holladay (2008) argued that there are other
equally effective but potentially less expensive apologetic devices that
a corporation could use to protect its reputation.
There are two potentially less expensive strategies, compensation
and sympathy, which are seen as similarly effective to apology because
they focus on the victims’ needs and serve to create public perception
that the organization is taking responsibility for the crisis (Coombs &
Holladay, 2008). Both referred to as highly accommodative strategies,
the sympathy response expresses concern for the victims, whereas
compensation offers victims something, such as financial help, to offset the suffering (Coombs, 2006; Fediuk, 2002).
Coombs and Holladay (2008) found that the three crisis response
strategies— sympathy, compensation, and apology—produced the same
amounts of anger and word-of-mouth intention outcomes. The lack
of differences in the amounts of anger and word-of-mouth intentions
produced between the response strategies could be attributed to the
nature of the study—an industrial accident where no cause had been
determined and the public was less angry about the accident (Coombs
& Holladay, 2008).
Lyon and Cameron (2004), however, found that companies that
issued an apology were more likable and viewed as more ethical and
prosocial than companies that issued a defensive response. Because
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most victims want an apology, one can posit that an organization that
uses apology will experience less anger and negative word of mouth
from its publics. Research suggests that many victims want an apology, but as Coombs and Holladay (2008) pointed out, more research is
needed to compare apology to other victim-centered responses, such
as compensation and sympathy.
In the current study, there is a high attribution of crisis responsibility on the organization and a high level of public anger that should
be created by the crisis in which 116 lives were lost. The results from
the following main effect hypotheses will provide additional empirical evidence on whether there are any differences between apology,
compensation, and sympathy on postcrisis reputation, anger, and
negative word-of-mouth intention for organizations facing high crisis responsibility.
H4: An organization that uses apology will have better postcrisis
reputation evaluation than the organization that uses either
compensation or sympathy.
H5: An organization that uses apology will experience less public
anger than the organization that uses either compensation or
sympathy.
H6: An organization that uses apology will experience lower intentions of negative word of mouth than the organization
that uses either compensation or sympathy.
The belief that prior reputation can help an organization during
a crisis not only raises the question of the potential power that previous reputations have on subsequent information judgment but also
the possible interaction between response strategies and prior good
or bad reputations. Research is lacking on how previous reputations
and relationships between the organization and its stakeholders can
affect crisis management and specifically, the choice of crisis response
to use during a crisis. Lyon and Cameron (2004) proposed interaction effects between reputation and response type, but no significant
results were found.
Exploring whether there are any interaction effects between crisis
response strategies and prior reputation on postcrisis reputation, anger, and negative word-of-mouth intention would extend crisis communication research, which suggests that we should not view response
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strategy in a vacuum devoid of other variables such as prior reputation. The following three research questions are posed:
RQ1: What, if any, is the best combination of prior reputation and
response strategy on postcrisis reputation?
RQ2: What, if any, is the best combination of prior reputation and
response strategy on anger toward the organization?
RQ3: What, if any, is the best combination of prior reputation and
response strategy on negative word-of-mouth intention toward the organization?

Methods
Participants
Participants were from a convenience sample of 230 undergraduate
students enrolled in mass communication classes at a large public
university in South Central United States. About 66% (n = 152) of
the participants were female, and they ranged in age from 18 to 40
years old (M = 21.47, SD = 2.28). In terms of classification, .4% (n
= 1) was a freshman, 10.4% (n = 24) were sophomores, 27.8% (n =
64) were juniors, and 61.3% (n = 141) were seniors. About 2.6% (n
= 6) were Asian=Pacific Islander, 3.9% (n = 9) were Black=African
American, 14% (n = 34) were Hispanic=Latino, 78.3% (n = 180) were
White=Caucasian, and .4% (n = 1) did not indicate their race.
Design Materials and Procedure
The study used a 2 × 3 between-subjects design to assess two factors
in crisis communication and reputation management—prior corporate reputation (good and bad) and crisis response strategies (apology, sympathy, and compensation)—on an organization facing high
crisis responsibility.
Respondents in the main study were randomized into one of the
six conditions and assigned to read a one-page story of a fictitious airline experiencing high attribution of crisis responsibility following the
crash of one of its passenger planes and then fill out an immediate
posttest questionnaire. Participants’ stories were identical except for
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the prior reputation passage (manipulated to indicate that the airline
had either a good or bad prior reputation) and the crisis responsibility
passage (manipulated to demonstrate an apology, sympathy, or compensation response by the airline). (See Appendix A for an example
story and Appendix B for the crisis response strategy manipulations.)
Two graduate students with a background in journalism were used
to cross-check the stories for the Associated Press writing style. A pretest was then conducted with a randomly selected group of 60 undergraduate Mass Communication students similar to the ones who took
part in the main study. The researchers visited three undergraduate
classes and randomly distributed the stimuli articles and manipulation checks to student participants. Participants in the pretest group
correctly identified the prior reputation (good or bad) and crisis response strategies (apology, sympathy, and compensation) conditions.
Participants for the pretest were also able to indicate that the story
reflected a strong attribution of crisis responsibility on the airline.
To ensure high attribution of crisis responsibility on the part of
the airline, the story was manipulated to indicate that the airline had
failed to schedule the ill-fated plane for routine checks on its fuel
tanks leading to an accident in which 116 people had died. The story
quoted findings from preliminary investigations into the accident stating that the ill-fated plane was overdue for routine checks on its fuel
tanks and that the accident had been caused by multiple fuel tank
discrepancies.
The research was conducted in a classroom setting. Participants
received a packet containing directions, a print news story, and a
posttest questionnaire. In addition, they were verbally instructed to
carefully read the news story before proceeding to the questions that
followed. The entire process took about 15 minutes.
Measures
Condition Manipulation Check for Prior Reputation (Good or Bad)
To ensure participants perceived the prior reputation as intended
(dependent upon their condition assignment), participants’ impression
of the reputation of the airline prior to the accident was evaluated by
asking participants to indicate, ‘‘Overall, my impression of this organization’s prior reputation (before the crash) is.’’ Participants recorded
their responses on a 7-point semantic differential scale of three items
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ranging from 1 (very unfavorable) to 7 (very favorable); 1 (negative)
to 7 (positive); and 1 (disreputable) to 7 (reputable), which were was
averaged into a composite scale.
Respondents in the prior good reputation conditions should rate
prior reputation as significantly more positive compared to respondents in the prior bad reputation conditions. An independent-samples
t-test showed there were significant differences between prior good
and bad corporate reputation with prior good reputation being more
favorable, (M = 5.07, SD = 1.30) than prior bad reputation, (M = 3.33,
SD = 1.10), t(227) = _10.97, p <.001). Thus, the manipulation of prior
reputation was successful.
Condition Manipulation Checks for Crisis Response Strategy (Apology, Sympathy, or Compensation)
Every participant answered a series of three items to assess
whether they noticed the airline’s crisis response strategy, which is
necessary to ensure they read the article and that the manipulation
they received was successful. The item for apology stated, ‘‘Based on
the article you read, it is accurate to say that the airline is accepting
responsibility and offering an apology to the families of those who
perished in the accident.’’ The item for compensation asked, ‘‘Based
on the article you read, it is accurate to say that the airline is offering
compensation to the families of those who perished in the accident.’’
The item for sympathy stated, ‘‘Based on the article you read, it is accurate to say that the airline is offering its sympathies to the families of those who perished in the accident.’’ All items were measured
on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Each item was treated as a separate dependent variable in analysis as they each measured agreement with a separate response strategy and could not be combined.
Three one-way analyses of variance were run to check the manipulation of the three crisis response strategies (each strategy item was
a dependent variable for that condition’s manipulation check). Results
supported successful manipulations for all three strategies—compensation, F(2, 227) = 157.4, p<.001; sympathy, F(2, 227) = 16.76, p<.001;
and apology, F(2, 226) = 6.86, p<.05—with respondents within a condition being significantly more likely to identify the correct manipulation strategy compared to respondents outside of that condition.
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Postcrisis Reputation
The postcrisis organizational reputation was measured using a
five-item version of Coombs and Holliday’s (2008, 2009) Organizational Reputation Scale. One of the items read, ‘‘I do not Trust the
organization to tell the truth about this incident.’’ The items were
measured using a 7-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). In Coombs and Holliday’s (2008, 2009)
studies, the measure had a reliability coefficient alpha of .84. The scale
was also reliable for this study (α = .80, M = 3.87, SD = 1.15). In addition, a factor analysis using minimum likelihood extraction and a varimax rotation was conducted to further support the reliability of this
adapted scale. The initial extraction showed a single factor that explained 55.94% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.80) with factor loadings ranging from .61 to .74.
Anger
Anger toward the organization was measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
The scale, which was also adapted from Coombs and Holliday’s (2008,
2009) studies, had three items, and one read, ‘‘I feel annoyed toward
Expeditious Airline for what happened.’’ In the Coombs and Holliday
(2008, 2009) studies, the scale had reliability coefficient alphas of .88
(2008) and .82 (2009). The scale was also reliable for this study (α
= .76, M = 4.95, SD = 1.31). In addition, a factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction and a varimax rotation was conducted to
further support the reliability of this adapted scale. The initial extraction showed a single factor that explained 67.09% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.01) with factor loadings ranging from .65 to .82.
Word-of-mouth Intention
Negative word-of-mouth intention was measured using three items
anchored on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). An example of one of the items is ‘‘I
would encourage friends or relatives not to fly Expeditious Airlines.’’
In Coombs and Holliday’s (2008, 2009) studies, the scale had reliability coefficient alphas of .76 (2008) and .71 (2009). The scale was
also reliable for this study (α = .77, M = 5.23, SD = 1.24). In addition,
a factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction and a varimax rotation was conducted to further support the reliability of this
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adapted scale. The initial extraction showed a single factor that explained 68.81% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.06) with factor loadings ranging from .62 to .95.

Results
Reliabilities
The three reliability coefficients for the dependent measures in this
study represented acceptable (≥.7) to good (≥.8) reliability scores
(George & Mallery, 2003). One of the adapted scales, negative wordof-mouth intentions, had a higher reliability than the original scale,
and the other two adaptions had lower reliabilities, although still
within acceptable ranges and consistent with the variation exhibited
in other studies using these scales. These differences may be due to
the adaption of these scales to a different organization, Expeditious
Airlines, which perhaps resulted in small variations in how the individual items relate to each other.
Main Effects of Prior Reputation
H1 stated that an organization with prior good reputation will have
a better postcrisis reputation evaluation than when that organization has a prior bad reputation. Table 1 presents results of postcrisis
reputation. Significant main effects of corporate reputation were detected, F(1, 224) = 51.64, p<.001. Results indicated that a prior good
reputation resulted in a higher postcrisis reputation (M = 4.37, SD =
.95) than prior bad reputation (M = 3.39, SD = 1.12). Thus, H1 was
supported.
We also examined whether an organization with prior good reputation would experience less public anger than an organization with
prior bad reputation. Table 2 presents results of anger by prior reputation. Significant main effects of corporate reputation were found,
F(1, 223) = 10.11, p<.05. Results indicated that prior bad reputation
elicited more anger (M = 5.22, SD = 1.26) than prior good reputation
(M = 4.68, SD = 1.31). H2 was thus supported.
H3 stated that an organization with prior good reputation would
experience lower intentions of negative word of mouth than an
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Table 1. Analysis of Variance for Postcrisis Reputation by Prior Reputation and Crisis Response Strategies
Source

SS

df

MS

F

p

Total
238.06
Prior reputation
54.88
Crisis response strategies
7.39
Prior Reputation×Crisis Response Strategies
.98

224
1
2
2

1.06
53.88
3.7
.49

51.64
3.48
.46

< .001
< .05
> .05

SS = Sum of Squares; MS = Mean of the Squares

Table 2. Analysis of Variance for Anger by Prior Reputation and Crisis Response Strategies
Source

SS

df

MS

F

p

Total
324.73
Prior reputation
14.72
Crisis response strategies
16.40
Prior Reputation×Crisis Response Strategies 10.10

223
1
2
2

1.46
14.72
8.20
5.10

10.11
5.63
3.47

< .05
< .05
< .05

SS = Sum of Squares; MS = Mean of the Squares

Table 3. Analysis of Variance For Negative Word-Of-Mouth Intention by Prior Reputation
and Crisis Response Strategies
Source

SS

df

MS

F

p

Total
309.79
Prior reputation
38.39
Crisis response strategies
1.20
Prior Reputation×Crisis Response Strategies
.42

224
1
2
2

1.38
38.39
.60
.21

27.76
.43
.15

< .001
> .05
> .05

SS = Sum of Squares; MS = Mean of the Squares

organization with prior bad reputation. Table 3 presents results of
negative word of mouth by prior reputation. Significant main effects
of corporate reputation were detected, F(1, 224) = 27.76, p<.001. Results indicated that an organization with prior bad reputation is more
likely to experience intentions of negative word of mouth (M = 5.64,
SD = 1.18) than an organization with prior good reputation (M = 4.82,
SD = 1.16). H3 was supported.
Main Effects of Crisis Response Strategy H4 proposed that an organization that uses apology will have better post-crisis reputation evaluation than when the organization uses either compensation or sympathy. Table 1 shows results of postcrisis reputation by crisis response
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strategy. Results showed significant differences between apology, sympathy, and compensation, F(2, 224) = 3.48, p<.05, with apology being rated the highest (M = 4.08, SD = .99) followed by sympathy (M
= 3.89, SD = 1.20) and compensation (M = 3.66, SD = 1.21). Post hoc
analysis showed the differences were between apology and compensation, such that when the airline responded with an apology it had a
more positive postcrisis reputation than when it responded to the crisis by using a compensation strategy. H4 was thus supported through
the significant difference between apology and compensation, but no
differences were found between apology and sympathy.
H5 proposed that an organization that uses apology will experience
less public anger than when the organization uses either compensation
or sympathy. Table 2 shows results of anger by crisis response strategy. Results showed there were significant differences between apology, sympathy, and compensation on anger, F(2, 223) = 5.63, p<.05,
with compensation being rated the highest (M = 5.30, SD = 1.09) followed by sympathy (M = 4.90, SD = 1.24) and apology (M = 4.67, SD
= 1.51). Post hoc analysis showed the differences were between apology and compensation, such that when the airline responded with an
apology, it was likely to elicit less anger than when it responded using a compensation strategy. H5 was supported through the significant difference between apology and compensation, but no differences
were found between apology and sympathy. H6 proposed that an organization that uses apology will experience less negative word-ofmouth intention than when the organization uses either compensation
or sympathy. No significant main effects of crisis response on negative word-of-mouth intention were detected. H6 was not supported.
Interaction Effects
Interactions effects between the two factors (prior reputation and response strategy) were investigated. RQ1 asked what, if any, is the best
combination of prior reputation and response strategy on postcrisis
reputation; no significant interactions were found. Interactions, however, were detected for the RQ2 that asked what, if any, is the best
combination of prior reputation and response strategy on anger toward the organization. Results showed there was an interaction effect
between response strategy and prior reputation on anger, F(2, 223) =
3.47, p<.05, such that for the organization with prior good reputation,
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Figure 1. Interaction between response strategy and prior reputation on anger.

compensation (M = 5.30, SD = 1.18) produced more anger than apology (M = 4.30, SD = 1.48). Figure 1 shows the interaction effect between prior reputation and response strategy on anger. The interaction effect, however, disappeared for prior bad reputation condition
with all of the response strategies eliciting strong anger responses
(apology, M = 5.00, SD = 1.48; sympathy, M = 5.38, SD = 1.25; compensation, M = 5.28, SD = 1.01). RQ3 asked, what, if any, is the best
combination of prior reputation and response strategy on word-ofmouth intentions; no significant interactions were detected.

Discussion
This study examined the effects of three crisis response strategies
(sympathy, compensation, and apology) and prior reputation (good
and bad) on the organization’s postcrisis reputation, anger toward the
organization, and negative word-of-mouth intention about the organization. The study extended Coombs and Holladay (2008) research
by examining crisis communication and reputation management for
an organization facing high crisis responsibility.
The findings provide insights on corporate stakeholders’ attitudes
toward an organization as a function of prior reputation and choice
of crisis response strategy. Results indicate that stakeholders prefer
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apology over compensation response strategies for an organization
facing high crisis responsibility. Corporate stakeholders are more
likely to get angry toward an organization that compensates victims
following a crisis than when it offers an apology. The results also suggest that stakeholders are more likely to positively evaluate an organization that uses an apology than an organization that employs a compensation strategy. Crisis managers facing crises that generate high
attribution of crisis responsibility and anger are thus advised to consider using apology rather than compensation response strategy.
The findings also suggest that organizations with a prior good reputation have better postcrisis reviews than those with a prior bad reputation, often regardless of the organization’s crisis response strategy.
Organizations with prior good reputation will have less public anger
and less negative word-of-mouth intention following a crisis than organizations with prior bad reputation. The significance of prior good
reputation for an organization highlights the need for precrisis public relations to build a strong positive precrisis reputation.
This study suggests an interaction between crisis response strategies and prior reputation on stakeholders’ anger toward the organization. Results show that for the organization with prior good reputation, compensation strategy produced more anger than apology
strategy. This finding perhaps points to the sensitive nature of monetary compensation that an organization with prior good reputation
can extend to victims of a crisis. The elicitation of more anger for an
organization that uses compensation may be indicative of stakeholders’ aversion to compensating lost lives with money.
Results of this study also offer suggestions on some of the issues
that key publics such as the victims of a crisis, negotiators for the victims, consumers, and members of the society in general should know
when faced with a crisis of high attributions toward any organization.
First, there is a need to understand that an organization=individual
involved in a crisis of high attributions should own up to the mistake
and take full responsibility for the crisis. In addition, the organization
involved in this type of crisis should either offer an apology or compensation, or a combination of both in a timely effort to minimize the
impact of the crisis on the victims.
The victims, negotiators for the victims, consumers, and society in
general should also be able to differentiate between a partial apology
and full apology because these two strategies serve different purposes,
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yielding different impacts on the victims and other publics. Although
a full apology involves the organization acknowledging the crisis, taking full responsibility for the crisis, and stating what the organization
will do to avert future crises, a partial apology entails an expression
of concern and regret and is geared toward protecting the organization from legal liability (Coombs, 2015).
Theoretical Implications
Findings from this study provide several theoretical implications for
the field of public relations and strategic communications. First, results of this study support extant literature of reputation management that states that an organization with prior good reputation will
enjoy a stronger postcrisis reputation. Because a crisis inflicts damage on an organization’s reputation, a favorable prior reputation can
act as insurance against the reputational capital lost by the organization following a crisis. Although the findings in this study support
the idea that prior good reputation can help an organization recover
quickly from a crisis, and prior bad reputation may hinder quick recovery, it is important to note that prior reputation alone does not
dictate crisis recovery.
Second, this study contributes to attribution theory with new evidence that shows that emotion and behavior such as anger and negative word-of-mouth intention, which emerge from attributions of
crisis responsibility, are a function of other variables such as prior
organizational reputation. Findings show that emotional responses
such as anger and behavioral intentions such as spreading negative word of mouth are greater for an organization with prior bad
reputation than the one with prior good reputation. These findings
show that outcomes of attribution of crisis responsibility must be
viewed in the context of other organizational factors such as prior
reputation.
In addition, results show that outcomes of attribution of crisis responsibility, such as anger toward the organization, are a function of
the crisis response strategies that are used by the organization. An
organization that uses apology will experience less anger from stakeholders than an organization that uses compensation strategy. These
findings further point to the significance of not assessing the outcomes
of attributions of crisis responsibility in a vacuum.

K i a m b i & S h a f e r i n M a s s C o m m u n i c at i o n a n d S o c i et y 1 9 ( 2 0 1 6 )

20

Finally, results of an interaction between crisis response strategy
and prior reputation on anger offer new additional empirical evidence
on the conceptual links between crisis response strategies and elements of crisis situation. The existence of a conceptual link between
crisis response strategy and crisis situation is a key tenet of SCCT.
According to SCCT, crisis responsibility is a function of crisis type
and severity of damage, whereas the choice of crisis response strategy
is in turn a function of crisis type. Results of an interaction between
crisis response strategy and prior reputation on anger, which showed
compensation strategy producing more anger than apology for an organization with prior good reputation, offer crucial supporting empirical evidence to SCCT’s contention on the existence of conceptual links
between the elements of crisis situation (crisis responsibility, crisis
history, and prior relational reputation) and crisis response strategies.
Limitations and Future Research
One of the key limitations of this study touches on the one-time measurement of corporate reputation. As literature shows, corporate reputation is formed through the accumulation of perceptions over time of
the people who interact with the organization. As this study was done
with a fictitious organization, it was not possible for participants to
have formed perceptions about the organization over time; however,
future research should focus on assessing corporate reputation over
time through advanced measurement techniques and in selecting the
organization under study.
The other limitation of this study is that it used a fictitious airline to examine crisis communication and reputation management for
an organization facing high crisis responsibility. A different outcome
may have been obtained had this study been done with real events and
organizations. In addition, different results may have been obtained
had this study been conducted using actual victims of a crisis instead
of nonvictims. Future research could make use of real victims as opposed to nonvictims and establish whether results would be different.
Another limitation might be the use of a student sample. The use
of a convenience sample of students majoring in communication
may also be seen as a limitation. Presumably, research participants
with communication backgrounds may have had higher familiarity
with the research topic and their speculation into the purpose of the
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experiment could have brought error into the study. Future research
should also attempt to improve external validity by using samples selected from the wider population and not student samples.
The current study used traditional print media to report on the organization’s crisis response. Future research should also explore the
role of social media and multimedia in crisis situations. It is possible
that the communication delivery mode impacts how a crisis response
is processed by the target public.
Based on anecdotal evidence in trade publications to the effect that
the timing of issuing an apology, sympathy, or compensation would
perhaps make a difference in how stakeholders evaluate postcrisis
reputation, future research should incorporate the time variable to
determine whether there will be any differences between an apology
that is delivered immediately following a crisis and an apology that
is offered at a later date. Another future direction may be to examine
the combined effects of more than one crisis response strategy (e.g.,
organization responds with an apology and compensation). Although
the between-subjects conditions for response strategy do not allow for
an examination of combined strategy effects, it may be an important
practical and theoretical question to study in future research.
This study did not make use of all possible dependent variables
that could have possibly been included in such a study and future studies should endeavor to incorporate other dependent variables. Dependent variables such as intentions to fly, credibility, and account acceptance (how participants feel about the crisis response offered by the
organization) can be considered in future studies. In addition, besides
anger and negative word of mouth, there are many other potential reactions that can emerge from societal members as a sign of their dissatisfaction with an organization involved in a crisis, such as boycotting, advocacy against their practices, which were not the focus of this
article but may be important to study in the future.
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Appendix A

Airline probed in Italian plane crash
Saturday, May 8, 2010 | 9:33PM ET

The Associated Press

A preliminary investigative report into the cause of last week’s plane
crash in Perugia, Italy blames the airline for failing to schedule the
ill-fated aircraft for the requisite service and maintenance checks.
The airline, Expeditious Airline, is scheduled to launch domestic
flights in the United States in late 2012. Its maiden U.S. flight from
Dallas to New York scheduled for December 10, 2012, is fully booked.
The investigations conducted by the Italian Civil Aviation Authority in collaboration with the U.S. National Transportation Safety
Board and Boeing experts from the United States established that the
plane was overdue for routine checks on its fuel tanks.
‘‘We were able to establish that the plane had flown for four
months without service checks on its fuel tanks. As standard procedure, the tanks must be serviced after every two weeks’’ the report
read in part. The report points to multiple fuel tank discrepancies
that could include fuel leakage and sealant deterioration.
The Expeditious Airline plane crashed approximately two minutes after take-off killing all 116 people on board. The London bound
Boeing 737-800 had passengers from 12 nations, most of them tourists who had travelled to the artistic city of Perugia for holiday.
Among those on board were 43 Americans, 22 Britons, 10 Australians, five Brazilians, and eight Nigerians. An eye witness said ‘‘the
plane fell head first and its nose was buried on the ground.’’ The jet
disintegrated on impact.
Expeditious Airline is considered one of Italy’s safest airlines.
This is the airline’s first crash since it was established 45 years ago in
1965. It has won Italy’s coveted Airline of the Year award seven times.
In a statement to the media, Expeditious Airline’s Chief Executive
officer Mercello Cassani offered an apology to the families and relatives of the deceased: ‘‘We at Expeditious Airlines accept responsibility for the air crash. We apologize and hope those who have been
affected by the incident can forgive us.’’
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Appendix B: The Three Crisis Response Strategy Manipulations

Sympathy:

‘‘We at Expeditious Airlines are deeply saddened by
this incident. The safety of our passengers, employees and stakeholders is of utmost importance to us. Our
thoughts and prayers go out to those affected by this
incident.’’

Compensation:

‘‘We at Expeditious Airlines will pay for the needs of the
families and relatives of the victims of this crash during this time of mourning. To compensate for the loss,
an agreement will be reached soon with the negotiating
parties on the amount to be paid to those who lost their
loved ones.’’

Apology:

‘‘We at Expeditious Airlines accept responsibility for the
air crash. We apologize and hope those who have been
affected by the incident can forgive us.’’

